EDITORIAL

Land Release Liability
Who should be responsible for any adverse events after clearance? The process of transferring
liability from an operator to the state seems biased due to an inherent conflict of interest.

by Sean Moorhouse [ Mine Action Consulting ]

I

f a mine/explosive remnant of war (ERW) accident occurs
in previously released land, who is liable for the damage
caused? This is a question that many national mine action

authorities (NMAA) ask and one that I was asked in Laos and
Bosnia-Herzegovina during two recent workshops on liability
in mine action, which were facilitated by the Geneva International Centre on Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) guide
mine action organizations by establishing principles and specifying international requirements in mine action. IMAS 07.11,
Amendment No. 2, released 1 March 2013, contains important
elements that help point the way toward answering questions
on liability. Moreover, the amendment raises a few additional
questions of its own, which require answers if IMAS is to be
thoroughly implemented.
Land Release Clarification

Known for being difficult to translate into languages other than English, the term land release has become problematic
over the years. In addition, although most people in the mine
action community have a good understanding of land release,
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many continue to conflate land release (land determined as be-

What happens when released land is found to contain

ing safe to use) with land cancellation (land never contaminat-

an unexploded device or an explosion occurs? IMAS 07.11

ed). Combining the two concepts into one can cause confusion.

uses the term adverse event to describe such incidents.

Land release—an evidence-based threat assessment de-

Unfortunately, these adverse events will occur from time

termining where full clearance is or is not required—is only

to time. Although perfection is the goal, it cannot always

concerned with increasing the efficiency of mine action activi-

be achieved; some mines/ERW might be missed during the

ties. Like anything in the dynamic world of mine action, land

clearance process.

release is subject to constant refinements, which explains why

IMAS 07.11 contains three key elements that determine liability in the event that any adverse event occurs:

the latest IMAS 07.11 came into being.
The new IMAS 07.11 describes land release as “… an evidence-based decision-making process that helps determine
with confidence which land needs further action and which

• Reasonable effort
• Residual risk
• Transfer of liability from operator to state

does not. It involves the identification of hazardous areas, the

IMAS 07.11 describes all reasonable effort as “… a minimum

cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduc-

acceptable level of effort to identify and document contami-

tion of land through technical survey and the clearance of

nated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/

land with actual mine/ERW contamination.”

ERW. ‘All reasonable effort’ has been applied when the com-
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This 13-year-old Sri Lankan boy lost his foot while working in
his family’s garden after the area was partially cleared.
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mitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.”1
NMAA should define what actions and parameters make
up all reasonable effort for the different processes concerned.
For example, in areas where clearance is deemed necessary,
national standards determine a minimum clearance depth
and target size for clearance. For metal detectors, the target
size is determined as the smallest piece of metal the detector
must be able to find, to represent the signal of the mines/ERW
being cleared. For animal detection systems, it is the smallest
explosive trace.
The second element, residual risk, is unavoidable. A residual risk of encountering mines/ERW in any post-conf lict
country will always exist, yet with every item found and
destroyed, risk is reduced (albeit not entirely eliminated).
Even in manually cleared areas, using all reasonable—or
even unreasonable—effort, a chance always remains that an
item was missed. Mine action’s goal is to reduce that risk to

A mine was found and marked in an area declared clear of
mines in Sri Lanka.

a tolerably low level. Each NMAA must determine its own

When land is released, regardless of the method used, a

risk-tolerance level.

formal handover process should take place where the operator

The third and final element is the transfer of liability from

relinquishes liability to NMAA, an agent of the state. There-

the operator to the state. IMAS defines liability as “… any le-

fore, the responsibility should immediately transfer to the

gal responsibility, duty or obligation that a country, organisa-

state when a formal handover process occurs. Additionally, li-

tion or individual may have. Liability in relation to an adverse

ability handover should be a clearly and explicitly identified

event, such as an accident or the discovery of a missed item in

moment in time.

an area, is normally linked to non-compliance with an agreed
policy or procedure.”1

On the other hand, NMAA may wish to delay this
handover for as long as possible, so that the operator retains
liability. This delaying tactic should not be allowed, because

Transfer of Liability

if there are concerns about the quality of the work, NMAA

IMAS 07.11 assumes the operator is liable for any damages that may occur during clearance—which, although un-

would require that the operator solve the problems and
certify the work’s completion.

derstandable, seems a little unfair. After all, the operator was
not responsible for placing mines/ERW in the area. Worse, if

Holding an Operator Liable

the clearance organization had not taken all of the physical

However, IMAS 07.11 states that an operator will, at least in

risks involved in clearing the devices, it would have assumed

principle, retain some liability in cases of incidents caused by

no liability and the land would still be contaminated. Yet in

suspected missed mines/ERW in four circumstances. Specifi-

deciding to clear the devices—whether for profit or humani-

cally, some liability is retained if an investigation shows that

tarian purposes—the operator effectively becomes liable for

“i) the accident was caused by wilful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct or a con-

any damages caused during clearance.
IMAS clarifies that the operator is liable if an accident occurs during the operation, but at what point does the state as-

scious, f lagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the
individual(s) harmed;

sume liability? In areas with no evidence of contamination,

ii) the organisation was not properly accredited, licensed,

land is released to the community without executing any

certified or authorised to carry out acts leading to the errone-

technical survey or full clearance. The non-technical survey

ous land release decision;

process is specified according to national standards, implemented by the operator and quality managed by NMAA. Is
there any difference in the operator’s liability if an adverse
event occurs in an area released without being processed?

2

iii) the organisation wilfully infringed prevailing national
policy or standards;
iv) the organisation had conducted gross procedural errors
or grossly deviated from an agreed land release concept.”1
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Mines found after clearance create risks for local residents.

While these conditions on liability

adverse events worldwide. Currently,

transfer make sense in theory, they do

this is unlikely to happen. Until it does,

not in practice. Although IMAS 07.11

the humanitarian mine action commu-

does not specify which organization

nity is left with the uncomfortable sta-

would be responsible for conducting an

tus quo of NMAA determining whether

investigation into any adverse event af-

it itself is liable or if that liability should

ter land release, in practice, the relevant

be placed on the operator.

NMAA would be responsible. This cre-

As to the original question: If there is

ates an inherent conflict of interest, as

a mine/ERW accident in previously re-

NMAA is one of the parties that could

leased land, who should be liable for the

be found at fault in any investigation.

damage caused? The answer is: The state

Therefore, it should not be investigat-

should be liable prior to and after land

ing itself.

release, because it owes a duty of care to

The State Must Accept Responsibility

interest to have a national mine action

A potential way around this conflict

authority investigating an accident that

of interest would be to have a suprana-

could determine that the state it forms

tional body, perhaps the United Nations

part of is liable. In the final analysis, I

Mine Action Service or GICHD, that

posit the state is liable both prior to land

would be responsible for investigating

release and after land release.

its citizens and visitors. It is a conflict of

See endnotes page 50
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